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1. Introduction 
  The reform process in the Czech Republic (and former Czechoslovakia), which after 
some preparations in 1990 started in 1991 has been implemented along two major reform 
lines: 
- microeconomic restructuring including privatization, liberalization of prices and markets,  
and 
-  creation of a market-typed institutional framework with the stress put on commercial 
banking and capital markets. 
  The success which was achieved up till now in the field of macroeconomic 
stabilization is clearly visible. In spite of the price shock in the first three months of 1991 due 
to the price liberalization and the cuts of subsidies, the monthly consumer price increases 
since then until the end of 1992 did not surpass 2 percent and in 1992 annual inflation rate 
was 11.3 per cent, which was the lowest figure among all the ex-communist countries. A 
slightly higher inflation in 1993 - estimated at 21 per cent at annual rate - reflects the price 
increase resulting from the new tax system introduced in January 1993 and the impacts of 
starting economic recovery. Low inflationary expectations bring forth favourable impacts on 
entrepreneurial climate in the economy. 
  The external stabilization of the economy has been reflected in the exchange rate of 
the Czechoslovak Koruna (CSK) which after the massive devaluation at the end of 1990 (by 
more than 100%) remained stable during 1991-92. This stability has been maintained in spite 
of the widening scope of internal convertibility, the balance of payments and foreign 
exchange reserves fluctuations at the end of 1992 due to the expected split of 
Czechoslovakia. After the split the Czech Republic has kept the exchange rate of the Czech 
Koruna (CK) unchanged while Slovakia devalued the Slovak Koruna (SK) by 10 per cent. At 
the end of 1993 the external reserves of the Czech banking system reached USD 6 billion1, 
the highest level in the post-war period. 
                                                 
    1 1 bn = 1.000.000.000 
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  The price paid for the macroeconomic stabilization and the collapse of Comecon was 
a sharp decline in economic activity. During 1991 GDP in real terms decreased by 14.2 per 
cent followed by further 7.1 per cent in 1992 and estimated 0.7 per cent in 1993, the total 
decline between 1990-1993 being 22.7 per cent. In the mid-1993, however, first signs of 
economic recovery could be observed, especially within construction, household 
consumption and imports of technology. In spite of the above decline in economic activity 
the unemployment rate remained very low: 6.6% and 5.1% in Czechoslovakia and 4.1% and 
2.4% in the Czech Lands at the end of 1991 and 1992 respectively. At the end of 1993 
unemployment rate in the Czech Republic was 3.4 per cent. 
  Some progress but far less impressive was achieved within microeconomic 
restructuring as well. Almost one thousand big industrial enterprises were privatized through 
voucher privatization representing the property of more than USD 7 bn (in book value). A 
number of other firms have been privatized using standard privatization methods. In 1993 
more than 70 per cent of retail sale is back in private hands and the share of private sector in 
GDP is estimated to approach 55 per cent. All this at the background of the starting 
conditions in 1990 when 98 per cent of total capital stock was in the state and cooperative 
ownership. Continuous changes may be also observed in monetary and credit policy of 
commercial banks. As opposed to the initial tight conditions under which credits were 
extended to state-owned enterprises, in 1992-1993 monetary and credit policies were relaxed 
and new credits were allocated mostly to the private sector. The overall stable environment 
and the increasing role of the market behaviour allowed also fiscal authorities to ease the 
former tight measures to some extent. 
  Nevertheless, the structural development of the economy has considerably lagged 
behind. The industrial structure has changed very slowly and in fact the position of primary 
and low value-added industries, including energy, has been strengthened. More than 30 per 
cent of industrial output is still produced in enterprises with more than 5,000 employees 
which reflects a bias towards large-size companies. As regards exports the shares of 
machinery and transport equipment decreased sharply and the role of industries within 
primary sector and industries processing raw materials increased. 
  A relatively successful macroeconomic stabilization has been accompanied by a 
surprisingly low unemployment - especially in the Czech Republic - where unemployment 
rate stayed at 3.4 in December 1993, which indicates that microeconomic restructuring has Macroeconomic Policies... 
 
 -  5 -  CASE Foundation 
not yet taken place in the extent that could be compared with macroeconomic performance. 
This in turn means that the issue of macroeconomic stabilization will have to be addressed 
again in the near future. 
2. Macroeconomic Stabilization Policies   
  Macroeconomic stabilization was meant to set up necessary conditions for 
microeconomic transformation, first of all for a mass-scale privatisation and creation of 
competitive markets. Simultaneously, currency convertibility was introduced. On the macro 
level aggregate demand had to be put under control, and a reasonable balance in foreign 
exchange payments built-up, at least in the medium term (the flow issue), along with a 
sufficient level of reserves (the stock issue). The main avenue towards these goals was seen 
in the implementation of the government's stabilization programme, based on the restrictive 
stance of macroeconomic policies. On the micro level a satisfactory standard of financial 
discipline was particularly required. 
  However, under the given conditions, a number of serious constraints were faced:  
-  stabilization policies had to be applied within the mostly "inherited" institutional 
framework, in an almost entirely "socialized" economy. The responsiveness of the traditional 
state enterprises to restrictive fiscal, monetary and credit policies was hardly predictable, but 
it had to be assumed as a relatively low, 
-  the economic policy calibration and targeting had to cope with the discontinuities of 
previous trends and with a rather high degree of uncertainty of the current economic 
development. This uncertainty was due to both the legacy of the past as well as to a number 
of external shocks, coinciding with fundamental institutional changes initiated domestically. 
  With the resolution to cope with those limitations, the authorities tried to adjust their 
policies accordingly and 
- linked the instruments of the traditional stabilization policies (fiscal, monetary and credit) in 
a pragmatic way with the instruments of wage and incomes policies (i.e. with the elements of 
so-called heterodox approach), 
- opted for a more restrictive stance of their policies and for an "overshot" of the domestic 
currency that seemed warranted by relatively stabilized macroeconomic situation of 
Czechoslovakia, Klacek & Hrncir 
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- made the efforts to increase the volume of foreign exchange reserves. In improving the 
initial non-satisfactory situation in foreign exchange reserves, a substantial support has been 
provided by international institutions, particularly by the IMF and by the EC. 
3. Disciplinary Role of Fiscal Policy 
  Fiscal policy, as the integral part of the antiinflationary policy of the government, was 
intended to play a crucial role of restraining overall demand throughout the transition period. 
The budgets of general government - comprising that of the federation and republics, local 
authorities and extrabudgetary funds - were conceived broadly speaking as balanced. The 
similar effect was to be induced by reducing the role of government in the economy - 
excessively high in the pre-reform period - in terms of decreasing gradually the ratio of 
budget receipts/expenditures to GDP. 
  But this does not exhaust the goals/constraints taken into account by the government. 
It has been difficult to formulate a budget that is restrictive enough and which at the same 
time does not exacerbate the demand-induced decline in output and is also capable of 
meeting the most pressing demands of the social safety net. Careful attention was payed to 
the composition of expenditure, with the aim of restraining government consumption 
(especially military spending). Subsidies have been step by step reduced (particularly those 
for agriculture and housing). 
  Although one cannot infer the fiscal stance of government from the budget 
surplus/deficit alone, the results look persuasive. In 1990 the budget of general Czechoslovak 
government ended up with a minor surplus, in 1991 with a deficit, which represented about 
1.0 per cent  of GDP and in 1992 with the deficit not exceeding 0.6 per cent of GDP (at the 
same time the budget of general government of Czech Republic was run  with minor surplus). 
It is noteworthy that the proceeds from privatization have been kept outside the budgets. In 
the beginning of 1993 Czechoslovakia was splitted into two independent states and each has 
followed its own fiscal policy. Preliminary data for 1993 indicate that the budget of general 
government of Czech Republic ended up with a relatively large surplus of 0.8 - 1.0 per cent 
of GDP. 
  In comparison with 1989 the ratio of budget expenditures to GDP decreased from 55 
per cent to about 45 per cent in 1993 (the projected budget of CR for 1994 has the ration Macroeconomic Policies... 
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about 43 per cent) - see Tables 1 and 2. This means that while the nominal 
receipts/expenditures increased, in real terms they decreased at the faster pace than real GDP.  
  Since 1989 till 1992 the structure of both state budgets' revenues and expenditures 
changed significantly. On the revenue side the share of corporate tax and agricultural tax 
declined while  the shares of income tax and turnover tax went up. Expenditures of the 
budgets were shifted to cover higher material, travel and wage costs as well as the costs of 
non-profit organizations. Transfers to corporate sector were in relative terms declining and 
the same tendency can be observed in social benefits which mainly reflects relatively low 
unemployment rate. These trends are depicted in Tables 3 & 3a and 4 & 4a.                                                    
 
Table 1. Total Revenues and Expenditures of All Budgets 1989-1993 
 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993*  1994*
Total Revenues (in bn CK)  415,4  463,1 505,5  540,0 401,5  431,8
Total Expenditures (in bn CK)  414,9  455,9 515,9  551,0 400,3  431,8
Surplus/Deficit +/- (in bn CK)  +0,5  +7,1 -10,4  -8,0 +1,2  0
Surplus/Deficit +/- (% of GDP)  +0,04%  +0,08% -1,0%  -0,6% +0,13%  0,0%
* 1989-1992  data for Czechoslovakia; 1993 estimates for Czech Republic; 1994 projection for Czech Republic 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of Czechoslovakia 
 
Table 2. Share of Overall Budgetary Expenditures on GDP (in per cent) 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993  1994*
54,7% 56,2% 52,8% 54,6% 45,0%  43,2%
* projection 
Note: Data from 1989-1992 are for Czechoslovakia and 1993-1994 for Czech Republic 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of Czechoslovakia  
 Klacek & Hrncir 
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Table 3. Revenues of State Budgets of Czechoslovakia in 1989-19 (in bn CK) 
                          1989      1990      1991      1992
 
Total revenues           314.8     355.8     467.5     487.9
Turnover tax              74.7     108.6     123.4     125.8
Corporate tax            174.6     177.7     191.0     181.3
Transfer and revenues  
of non-profit state  
institutions              27.6      32.4      32.0      32.3
Agricultural tax          22.6      21.2      21.7      13.9
Income tax*                2.1       2.3      67.3      94.9
Social insurance           0.7       0.8       7.2      11.0
Other revenues            10.9      12.7      24.8      28.7
 
* in 1989 and 1990 income tax collected by local budgets 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of Czechoslovakia 
 
Table 3a. Revenues of State Budgets of Czechoslovakia in 1989-1992 (in percent) 
                       1989     1990     1991     1992 
 
Total revenues          100      100      100      100 
Turnover tax             23.8     30.5     26.4     25.8 
Corporate tax            55.6     50.0     41.0     37.2 
Transfer and revenues  
of non-profit state  
institutions              8.9      9.1      6.8      6.6 
Agricultural tax          7.2      6.0      4.6      2.8 
Income tax                0.7      0.6     14.4     19.5 
Social insurance          0.2      0.2      1.5      2.2 
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Table 4. Expenditures of State Budgets of Czechoslovakia 1989-1992 (in bn CZK) 
                      1989      1990      1991      1992 
 
Total Expenditures    263.1     292.4     406.8     468.5 
in which: 
   Investments          7.4       8.3      17.0      19.3 
   Material costs and  
     maintainance       8.6       9.4      31.8      21.9 
   Services and Other  
     Non-productive 
     Expenditures      73.8      85.9      94.0      92.6 
   Travel costs         1.1      13.9      33.6      32.0 
   Wage costs           8.2       8.5      29.9      45.9 
   Social benefits     91.7      95.2     121.6     133.7 
   Contributions to non- 
     profit organizations 
     and subsidies to 
     cooperatives      27.0      28.1      30.3      75.9 
   Transfers to corporate 
     sector            45.2      43.0      48.3      47.2 
 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of Czechoslovakia 
Table 4a. Expenditures of State Budgets of Czechoslovakia 1989-1992 (in per cent) 
                           1989    1990    1991    1992 
 
Total Expenditures          100     100     100     100 
of which: 
  Investments                 2.8     2.8     4.2     4.1 
  Material costs and  
    maintainance              3.3     3.2     7.8     4.7 
  Services and other non- 
    productive expenditures  28.0    29.5    23.1    19.8 
  Travel costs                0.4     4.7     8.3     6.8 
  Wage costs                  3.1     2.9     7.4     9.8 
  Social benefits            34.9    32.6    29.9    28.5 
  Contributions to non- 
    profit organizations 
    and subsidies to 
    cooperatives             10.3     9.6     7.4    16.2 
  Transfers to corporate  
    sector                   17.2    14.7    11.9    10.1 
 
 
4. State Budget and State Debt Klacek & Hrncir 
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  When evaluating the financial position of the general government during the 
transition period it should be noted, that with the exception of foreign borrowing (from the 
European Economic Communities, World Bank and G24), the government practically did not 
resort to any financing outside the banking sector. Secondly, the central bank has been (and 
in CR still is) independent of any instructions given by the central government in providing 
for its primary objective to ensure the stability of domestic currency. Also by the law, the 
central bank has been forbidden to cover final budget deficits by direct credit to government. 
(Total amount of Treasury bills held by the central bank - which would cover short-term 
deficits in the current budget during the fiscal year - is also limited by the law.) 
  Thirdly, in determining the financial position of government the budget 
deficits/surplus played just a minor role. Net credit to general government of CSFR from 
domestic banking sector increased from almost a negligible level in 1990 to the level 
representing about 7 per cent of GDP in 1992. Gross indebtedness (both domestic and 
foreign) of the central government of CR was estimated in 1993 as representing about 21-22 
per cent of GDP in 1992, before final financial settlement between the CR and SR. Debt 
service in 1993 represented about 4 per cent of budget receipts of the Czech central 
government. 
  Among the major factors which contributed to the increase of  indebtedness were, 
firstly, the decision of the government to cover (net) capital losses of the banking sector 
connected with large devaluation of the domestic currency in 1990, secondly, its decision to 
eliminate the distortions in the previous linkages  between the government and the banking 
sector, which resulted in the taking-over of old, mostly dubious, government credits abroad 
and to some extent foreign liabilities of one commercial bank. This clean-up operation 
continued in connection with the split of CSFR and the central government of CR "inherited" 
a proportionate part of the federal government debts.  
  In the near future the government will likely need to step into safeguard bank deposits 
if a run of company bankruptcies evolves. Even if the broad bad-debt problem of the banking 
sector can be kept out of the budget (by covering the cost of enterprise debts out of bank 
provisioning and partly the proceeds from privatization) it is likely that the government will 
be involved to some extent in covering bank imbalances. Macroeconomic Policies... 
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5. New Tax System in 1993 
  In January 1993 the government of CR started to implement a sweeping reform of 
taxation and more generally of the whole budget system. The new tax system is fully 
consistent in its structure with the system used in the EC countries - see Tables 5 and 6. 
Apart from the most important innovation - the shift from turnover tax to a destination-type 
VAT - almost all tax structures were changed. The restructuring of the tax system was aimed 
at broadening of the tax base, removing distortions in the old system and making fiscal 
operations more efficient, transparent and equitable. 
  A major effort in the preparation of both the legislation and the administration for the 
new system was required, including the training of people to operate it. The government 
expected that the tax collection would face a variety of difficulties in the initial phase and 
took precautionary measures in the regulation of expenditures. At the same time new social 
security funds were established, with the Health Care Fund already independent of the budget 
and the Social Care Fund and Employment Fund to become independent in 1994. All of them 
are financed by special contributions paid partly by the employees and partly by the 
employers. The government budget is committed to contribute the Health Care Fund on 
behalf of those who cannot so themselves. 
  Finally, local budget reform was introduced. To ensure their relative financial 
autonomy, selected taxes were assigned to local governments, although legislation on taxes 
and fees remains uniform and centralized across the country. Along with the specific 
transfers the general purpose transfers should to some extent level out differences in the fiscal 
capacity of individual local governments. 
  As a more detailed breakdown of budgetary expenditures by sectors reveals 
expenditures to individual industries and housing, most of them subsidies, has been declining 
fast. The share of social expenditures, education and social insurance has increased. The shift 
in the structural patterns started in Czechoslovakia in 1990 has continued since 1993 also in 
the Czech Republic - see Tables 7 and 8.    Macroeconomic Policies... 
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6. Inflation and Wages 
  The role of macroeconomic policy in a transition economy is to prevent that once and 
for all jump in price level which follows liberalization of prices does not function as a starter 
of hyperinflation, affecting the overall stability of the economy and causing possible social 
unrest. To fulfil this aim, macroeconomic policy must address wage and income setting.  
  One cannot overemphasize the fact that during the transition period markets, and 
especially labour market, can hardly be relied upon as fully fledged and efficiently operating. 
In this context, the issue of indexation of wages and of other fixed incomes is a particularly 
sensitive one; wage and income policy may be considered to provide an anchor to 
stabilization policy. 
  In Czechoslovakia a tripartite commission was formed in 1990 representing 
government, trade unions and managers. It was empowered to set guidelines and limits on 
wage and income policy, including schemes for unemployment benefits. A bargaining 
process resulted in an agreement on the principles of wage indexation, minimum wage rates 
and unemployment benefits for 1991. It was agreed that wages could be raised in March 1991 
by 5 per cent to cover higher cost of living in 1990 and in the first quarter of 1991. Besides, if 
the price index in the first quarter were to increase by more than 25 per cent nominal wages 
were allowed to rise so that a maximum of a 12 per cent decline in real wage was allowed 
for. 
  In the case of inflation rate of 25 per cent, the minimum value of an implicit 
coefficient for wage indexation was thus fixed at 0.52 level. However, the value of the 
coefficient was not constant; the higher the inflation rate, the higher was the implicit value of 
the wage indexation coefficient and vice versa. (For an inflation rate of 40 per cent the value 
of the coefficient reaches 0.7.) Moreover, starting from the second quarter of the year, a 
further maximum decline of real wage was agreed to stay at 10 per cent. 
  Higher cost of living of pensioners and families with children were compensated to a 
larger extent than wages and salaries and the compensation schemes depended on the patterns 
of their expenditures. Unemployment benefits for the first six months of unemployment were 
determined at a 65 per cent rate of the last net salary, and the rate was lowered to 60 per cent Klacek & Hrncir 
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rate in the second six months of unemployment. Finally, the minimum wage rate was set at 
2.000 CK per month (60 per cent of the average wage) and 10.8 CK per hour. 
  Overall indexation of wages in 1991 resulted in 16.4 per cent  rise of money wage but 
the real wage rate declined by 24 per cent. In spite of much larger drop in real wage than 
envisaged the social consensus reached on the basis of Tripartite Agreement between trade 
unions, employers and government was preserved. 
  In 1992 the regulation of wages was partly relaxed (the rules were fixed only in June 
1992). The measures were selective in nature, directed mainly against a wage-push of the 
state-owned enterprises in order to countervail their short-term behavioural patterns. 
However, the money wage rate increased unexpectedly by 22.2 per cent and as the cost of 
living went up slower, the real wage increased by almost 10 per cent. At the same time 
productivity of labour declined - see Tables 9 and 10. 
Table 9.  GDP, Productivity and Wages in Czech Republic (Annual percent change) 
 
                           1990    1991    1992    1993* 
Real GDP                  - 1.2  - 14.2   - 7.1   - 0.5 
Employment                - 0.2   - 7.0   - 3.0   - 2.0 
Productivity of Labour    - 1.0   - 7.7   - 4.2   - 1.5 
Money Wage Rate             3.5    16.4    22.2    27.0 
Real Wage Rage            - 5.8  - 23.9     9.7     5.0 
* Preliminary data 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of CSFR 1992 and Reports of Czech Statistical Office 
 
Table 10. Labour Unit Costs and Prices in Czech Republic (Annual percent change) 
                          1990    1991    1992    1993* 
Labour Unit Costs
a)         4.5    26.1    27.1    28.9 
Consumer Prices            9.9    56.6    11.1    21.2 
GDP Deflator               9.5    46.4    10.0     ... 
a) Index of money wage rate divided by index of productivity of       labour 
* Preliminary data 
Source: Table 7 
  At the beginning of 1993 government abandoned regulation of wages, so that the 
former liberalization of prices and foreign trade was completed. General Agreement for 1993 
only stipulated, that as far as the increase of money wage rate exceeded the increase of Macroeconomic Policies... 
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consumer prices by more than 5 percentage points in the last quarter, the government would 
tailor appropriate measures. 
  In mid-1993 when nominal wages already exceeded the threshold the government 
reintroduced wage controls imposing a special corporate tax applicable to the companies 
violating 5 percentage points rule. 
7. Monetary and Credit Policies 
  The scenario of economic reform and government programme of 1990 called for 
restrictive stance of monetary and credit policies as an integral part of macroeconomic 
stabilization and liberalization package. The aim was to restore and to maintain price and 
monetary stability while implementing a sweeping price, foreign trade and foreign exchange 
liberalization at the beginning of 1991 and while profound institutional and systemic changes 
began to materialize. A consistent implementation of macroeconomic stabilization was 
regarded a key pre-condition for avoiding vicious circles of wage-price and devaluation-cost-
price spirals in the course of transition. By the same token ifwas also expected to create 
conditions for desirable advance of microeconomic and institutional restructuring and, 
consequently, for the success of entire transition. With the benefit of hindsight it can be 
claimed that the stabilization policies in former Czechoslovakia succeeded in securing the 
mentioned aims. However, the implied costs, in particular in terms of diminished output 
performance, proved to be significantly higher than expected.2 
  Referring to the relatively stabilised initial macroeconomic situation in former 
Czechoslovakia and confronting it with the extent of the incurred costs, the justification of 
the adopted restrictive policies  was repeatedly questioned by  some domestic as well as 
foreign observers.   
  It is true, despite a parallel legacy the starting conditions in former Czechoslovakia 
diverged from those in some other transition economies. This divergence was not, however, 
only positive one. The "comparative advantage" was limited to macroeconomic sphere: 
Czechoslovakia did not have to cope with already galloping open inflation, the existing 
                                                 
    2 The 16% fall in GDP in 1991 was far worse than the modest 5-6% drop predicted by the government. Klacek & Hrncir 
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monetary overhang reflecting inherited disequilibria and accumulated inflationary potential 
was relatively modest and relatively low was also the extent of foreign debt (Hrncir M., 
Klacek J., 1991). 
  On the other hand, the microeconomic and institutional foundations for a market type 
economy  were much less favourable (Charemza W.W., 1991). Unlike Hungary and Poland, 
Czechoslovakia lacked entirely private sector and market institutions, its economic structure 
was one-sidedly biased to big units. Monopolies, mostly administratively created, dominated. 
These institutional constraints notwithstanding, the Czechoslovak reform strategy opted for 
an abrupt price, foreign trade and foreign exchange liberalization, including the introduction 
of a domestic currency convertibility at the very start of transition. 
  Consequently, the adopted policies had to be targeted  not only on the "stock" issue, 
but in particular on the "flow" factors, to diminish the risk of inflationary pressures 
developing in the course of transition itself. It follows, apart from the argument that the 
restrictive stance should be "by definition" an integral part of macroeconomic stabilization 
and liberalization programmes, there were compelling "domestic" reasons for restrictive 
monetary and credit policies to be imposed in the initial stage of transition.  
  The controversial issue, and not only in Czechoslovakia, became the degree of 
restriction, the implied tightness of the policies as well as their time profile and calibration in 
individual stages. The diverging standpoints were expressed ex ante, in the course of policy 
making and in its implementation. The discussion, fuelled in particular by the unexpectedly 
high cost in terms of the decreased output and by the protracted period of the recession, has 
been going on also ex post. Calvo and Coricelli advanced the conclusion  suggesting  that 
monetary policies in transition economies were too tight and thereby exacerbated output falls 
(Calvo G., Coricelli F., 1992).  
  The available evidence on the relative role played by the depressed aggregate 
demand, by the shifts in the composition of demand and by the negative supply shocks in the 
experienced decline of output in former Czechoslovakia in 1990-1992 is not yet entirely 
convincing and clear. Most domestic as well as outside observers claimed, however, that the 
credit restraint was overshot also in the Czechoslovak case, in particular in the first months of Macroeconomic Policies... 
 
 -  19 -  CASE Foundation 
1991, contributing thus to a deeper depression than envisaged and justified.3  On the other 
hand it was argued that the  restrictive impact of monetary and credit policies should be 
qualified, pointing to such phenomena as the dramatic increase of interenterprise arrears and 
the persistence of negative real interest rates in the given period. 
  However, transition is not an uniform and steadily developing process. Both the 
underlying conditions and policies differred not only across individual countries but also in 
the course of time. It follows, the impact of restrictive policies must be evaluated with respect 
to individual phases and their specific features. Moreover, the policy aims and their outcomes 
significantly diverged in reality. The existing transmission mechanisms and adopted 
instruments, being co-responsible for the experienced gap between the policy aims and their 
results, turned to be an important causal factor. 
8. Monetary Policy Targets  
  With the start of transition, the restoration of internal and external stability of 
currency, i.e. stability of domestic price level together with the stability of exchange rate, and 
their sustainability became the major policy objective.  
  Though there was a general consensus on the desirability of these underlying long-
term objectives, a less straightforward issue was whether to set intermediary targets for 
conduct of monetary and credit policies, and in the positive case what types of targets should 
be adopted given the constraints and discontinuities implied at the start of transition. In 
favour of adoption of intermediary targets worked in particular the powerful arguments to 
discontinue the previous discretionary conduct of policies which resulted in "traditional" 
accommodative character of money supply and to stop the inertia of money "machine" 
generating funds in accordance with the "real" needs (Calvo, G.A., 1991). On the other hand, 
their potential merits were constrained by the existing conditions: by the lack of stabilized 
and credible relationship of monetary aggregates and by the discontinuities in development 
trends. Moreover, the institutional setting, including transmission mechanisms of monetary 
policy, was undergoing a  complete overhaul and adjustment. 
                                                 
    3 "Even Czechoslovakia implemented macroeconomic tightening in the IMF programme in January 1991, 
although there was no serious macro imbalance at the outset..Macroeconomic policy was therefore much too 
tight in the CSFR.." (Nuti D. M., Portes R., 1993, p. 10). Klacek & Hrncir 
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  These constraints notwithstanding, monetary authorities resorted to monetary 
targeting. The aim was to give a clear signal on their intentions in the course of individual 
stages of transition. And it was money supply, though in a differentiated versions, which was 
attributed the role of intermediary monetary target since 1990. 
  Judging from the targets, the highly restrictive stance set for 1990 and in particular for 
the first half of 1991 was relaxed already in the second half of 1991, while the policies for 
1992 and 1993 shifted in principle to a "neutral" character. It was only obvious that within 
the overall trend from the restrictive to neutral stance the Central Bank had to react to the 
diverging current developments, to the changed expectations and shocks like the split of the 
country at the end of 1992, and to calibrate its policy accordingly. Moreover, the institutional 
framework and transmission mechanisms of monetary policy were rapidly changing in the 
mentioned period. As a consequence, the targets used to control money supply and the means 
of their implementation had to be adjusted accordingly. Within a relatively short time spane 
their concrete forms shifted from the control of domestic credit creation in 1990, to the 
indicator of net domestic assets of the banking system from 1991 onwards and to the control 
of money supply as represented by M2 started in the second half of 1992.   
  In a parallel to monetary target, the Central Bank's policy followed an exchange rate 
objective since the beginning of 1991 and aimed to keep nominal exchange rate stable. 
However, though adhering to the strategy of "nominal exchange rate anchor" neither the 
government nor the Central Bank committed themselves to any pre-announced period of 
keeping the exchange rate unaffected. Given the uncertainties and shocks involved in 
transition, it appeared unrealistic to fix an "equilibrium rate" for long term and, being 
committed to it, to attempt to make it sustainable without inflicting unbearable costs on the 
economy. Notwithstanding, the nominal exchange rate of Koruna has been maintained stable 
since the beginning of 1991, i.e. already for more than three years (the changes implied only 
reflected the shifts in cross-rates of basket currencies).  
  The exchange rate objective was conceived as complementary to monetary target, not 
as its alternative. The feasibility of such an arrangement was conditioned by the initially 
relatively separated "domestic" monetary developments from the outside world. It is, 
however, obvious that the increasing monetary and financial openness of the country makes 
such a "dual" solution less viable in future.  Macroeconomic Policies... 
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9.  Implementation and Outcomes of Monetary Policies 
  Unlike Hungary and Poland, former Czechoslovakia moved to a two-tier banking 
system only at the start of transition, in 1990. Constrained by the underdeveloped 
institutional framework and by only limited range of available monetary policy instruments, 
the authorities set their target for 1990 in terms of an accrual to domestic credit volume. This 
reflected the existing conditions in which money supply was in principle determined just by 
domestic credit creation. According to the target, the volume of extended credits was to be 
kept within the range of minus 2 to plus 1 percent as against the end-1989 level. 
  As set, it was undoubtedly a rather restrictive target, implying  virtual stagnation of 
credit creation. Though the upper limit was relaxed to plus 2.6 percent in the second half of 
the year, reflecting substantial price increases resulting from the cuts in price subsidies 
(particularly for foodstuffs) and from administrative price corrections, the outcome at the end 
of the year was plus 0.8 percent, i.e. within the originally stipulated range.  
  From 1991 onwards, the indicator "net domestic assets of the banking system" in 
quarterly breakdown has been adopted instead to guide and to control money supply. It was 
defined as the difference between the liabilities of the banking system (in the concept of 
broad money, M2, i.e. money and quasi money) and the net foreign assets. Being one of a set 
of four indicators elaborated in co-operation with the IMF which qualified the corridor of a 
desirable macroeconomic development both in the domestic and external sectors of the 
economy, it represented the benchmark for calibration of monetary policies.  
  The period of 1991 and, in particular, the first months of the year represented the 
turning point in Czechoslovak transition and, at the same time, the period when monetary and 
credit restriction was the most severe. With the initiation of a sweeping liberalization 
programme in the previously heavily regulated economy, monetary authorities tightened the 
policies to prevent open inflation from accelerating. The resulting degree of restriction and its 
real impact were, however, co-determined by a number of qualifying factors. And 
particularly these qualifications made the evaluation of the policy outcomes rather 
controversial.   
  Apart from the adjustments of the policies themselves in the course of the year, a 
substantial divergence appeared between the authorities' intentions as reflected in the ex ante 
guide-lines and indicators on the one hand and their implementation on the other. The actual Klacek & Hrncir 
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accruals in the net domestic assets of the banking system, for example, proved to be 
considerably below the cumulative limits set for 1991. Accordingly, the total volume of 
credits granted by banks increased by only 2.2 percent in the first quarter of 1991 and by only 
4.2 percent in the first half of the year (compare Table 11).  
  The aggregate figures conceal, however, opposite trends in the composition of newly 
extended credits compared to 1990. While in 1990 the increases in banks' credits were almost 
entirely confined to credits extended to government, in the first half of 1991 the volume of 
this type of credits diminished and the main accruals materialized instead in credit allocations 
for enterprises. In the first quarter of 1991 the volume of credits to enterprises and 
households increased by almost 6% (5.6%) against the end of 1990.   
  Evaluating the data for the whole year, money supply increased by 20.8% (between 
the fourth quarters of 1990 and 1991, Table 12) compared to the increase in nominal GDP by 
18.6%. As price level measured by CPI increased in the same period by more than 1/2 (by 
53.6%), the real money supply diminished by 1/3, while the real GDP by 16.5%.  Credits  to  
enterprises  were  the most dynamic item of money supply, increasing by 25.9% in the course 
of 1991. Nevertheless, in real terms they were still by 1/5 below the to the end-1990 level.  
  These data have been often referred to in support of the arguments that monetary and 
credit restraint was excessive in the examined period, leading to a credit crunch and, 
consequently, unnecessarily repressing the level of economic activity. Two parallel factors 
are claimed to be responsible: the policy targets for money supply and credit volumes were 
too restrictive and, at the same time, the real outcomes proved to be even more restricted than 
intended. This applies in particular to the first months of 1991. While price level surged after 
sweeping liberalization by 25.8 % in January 1991 (as measured by CPI), instead of 
accommodating this once-for-all price level shift the volume of extended bank credits 
diminished even in nominal terms in that month. Though the credits to enterprises and 
households recovered in the course of the first quarter (and increased by 5.6% against the end 





Table 11. Czechoslovakia - Consolidated Assets of the Banking Sector in 1989-1992 (in bn CSK)*) 
                          1989    1990              1991                    1992 
                                           Q1     Q2     Q3     Q43)    Q1     Q2     Q3    Q4 
Net foreign assets 
  (in conv. currency)    17.8    -9.2   -19.1  -16.2   -0.8    18.5   44.3   69.8   79.6   59.8 
Net domestic assets     530.0   557.5   569.1  595.4  617.2   679.7  667.9  676.6  707.3  780.1 
 
Total domestic credits  583.6   640.2   656.0  667.3  695.6   755.7  743.5  780.0  828.5  876.9 
Net credit to 
  government             5.9    54.2
1)   37.9    8.6   11.6






Net credit to National 
  Property Fund           0.0     0.0    -0.9   -4.2  -11.7    13.7    1.9   -0.8  -10.3  -23.8 
Credits to enterprises 
  and households        577.7   586.0   619.0  662.9  695.7   700.0  715.3  746.1  788.9  814.7 
    Enterprises         530.8   536.0   567.8  611.3  642.6   644.6  659.0  690.2  726.0  748.3 
    Households           46.9    50.0    51.2   51.6   53.1    55.4   56.3   55.9   62.9   66.4 
Credits in foreign 
  exchange                ..      ..      ..     ..     ..      5.2   12.9   12.5   15.7   19.7 
 
 
*) End of quarter (year) data. 
1) Including the effects of devaluations in 1990. 
2) Including EC, World Bank and G-24 loans to government. 
3) Including debt-write off and bank recapitalization. 
 





Table 11a. Czech Republic - Consolidated Assets of the Banking Sector in 1991-1993 (in bn CK)*) 
          1991                1992                          1993 
                                     Q1      Q2      Q3     Q4
3)    Q1      Q2      Q3      Q4 
Net foreign assets 
  (in conv. currency)       15.4   32.1    51.5    75.3    49.2   51.9    69.7     86.3 
Net foreign assets 
  (CR/SR)                   11.1    7.0    15.0    13.9    26.0   26.0    26.0     26.0 
Net domestic assets        460.8  468.4   456.6   472.3   524.2  505.8   525.8    542.2 
 
Total domestic credits     527.6  518.5   538.5   572.4   612.8  611.4   644.2    667.8 
Net credit to government
1)   21.6    6.6     9.8    20.1    53.0   26.5    24.2     25.3 
Net credit to National 
  Property Fund              7.1    1.7    -3.1   -14.1   -24.5  -26.5   -28.3    -29.8 
Credits to enterprises 
  and households           495.4  499.8   522.1   551.3   567.8  594.7   628.2    650.8 
     Enterprises           459.2  462.4   484.8   507.1   521.3  549.2   583.2    606.4 
     Households             36.2   37.4    37.3    44.2    46.5   45.5    45.0     44.4 
Credits in foreign 
  exchange                   3.5   10.4     9.7    15.1    16.5   16.7    20.1     21.5 
 
*) End of quarter (year) data. 
1) Including WB, WB Japan, EC, G24 loanes to government. 
 




Table 12. Czechoslovakia - Money Supply in 1989-1992 (in bn of CSK) 
                             1989   1990             1991                       1992 
                                           Q1     Q2     Q3     Q4     Q1     Q2     Q3     Q4 
Broad money (M2)            547.8  548.3  550.0  579.2  616.4  698.2  712.2  746.4  786.9  839.9 
  Money (M1)                311.1  288.8  278.9  285.7  317.0  371.9  356.7  378.2  397.4  430.5 
    Currency (M0)            68.0   73.7   72.9   76.2   80.7   88.4   86.2   95.0   99.1   99.2 
      Households             62.8   69.0   67.4   70.3   74.7   81.2   79.1   86.4   89.2   87.2 
      Enterprises             5.2    4.7    5.5    5.9    6.0    7.2    7.1    8.6    9.9   12.0 
    Demand deposits         243.1  215.1  206.0  209.5  236.3  283.5  270.5  283.2  298.3  331.3 
      Households            107.5  103.4   94.3   92.0   91.4   94.2   94.9   96.6   96.2   97.5 
      Enterprises           135.6  108.9  106.8  112.4  139.0  184.6  166.7  180.2  196.1  231.8 
      Insurance companies     0.0    2.8    4.9    5.1    5.9    4.7    8.9    6.4    6.0    2.0 
  Quasi-money               236.7  259.5  271.1  293.5  299.4  326.3  355.5  368.2  389.5  409.4 
    Time and savings 
    deposits                232.5  231.7  243.6  254.0  254.3  279.9  298.5  302.4  312.5  330.1 
      Households            170.2  167.4  174.7  180.1  186.2  210.8  219.1  222.7  225.0  241.5 
      Enterprises             6.6   10.5   15.1   19.7   13.9   13.7   26.7   32.3   37.2   43.7 
      Insurance companies    55.7   53.8   53.8   54.2   54.2   55.4   52.7   47.4   50.3   44.9 
    Foreign currency 
    deposits                  4.2   27.8   27.5   39.5   45.1   46.4   57.0   65.8   77.0   79.3 
      Households              1.7    9.8   13.5   18.1   22.4   26.6   35.1   39.8   46.3   53.1 
      Enterprises             2.5   18.0   14.0   21.4   22.7   19.8   21.9   26.0   30.7   26.2 
 





Table 12a. Czech Republic - Money Supply in 1991-1993 (in bn CK) 
                                  1991             1992                         1993 
                                          Q1     Q2     Q3     Q4      Q1     Q2     Q3     Q4 
 
Broad money (M2)                 487.3  507.5  523.1  561.5  599.4   583.7  621.7  654.5 
  Money (M1)                     256.0  261.8  265.1  283.5  306.9   265.5  291.9  316.5 
    Currency (M0)                 55.3   62.3   58.1   60.7   58.9    36.0   46.9   53.1 
    Demand deposits              200.7  199.5  207.0  222.8  248.0   229.5  245.0  263.4 
      Households                  65.7   66.0   68.5   69.0   71.0    83.4   82.5   83.2 
      Enterprises                131.7  127.0  133.7  149.5  174.4   141.7  159.3  176.7 
      Insurance companies          3.3    6.5    4.8    4.3    2.6     4.4    3.2    3.5 
  Quasi-money                    231.3  245.7  258.0  278.0  292.5   318.2  329.8  338.0 
    Time and savings 
    deposits                     193.0  205.1  211.8  224.2  236.6   260.9  268.6  277.0 
      Households                 145.1  151.0  153.9  157.0  168.9   178.7  179.3  183.3 
      Enterprises                  8.9   17.6   26.9   32.0   30.0    43.5   48.3   52.2 
      Insurance companies         39.0   36.5   31.0   35.2   37.7    38.7   41.0   41.5 
    Foreign currency 
    deposits                      38.3   40.6   46.2   53.8   55.9    57.3   61.2   61.0 
      Households                  24.0   25.8   29.4   34.4   37.9    41.5   42.0   44.2 
      Enterprises                 14.3   14.8   16.8   19.4   18.0    15.8   19.2   16.8 
 
Source: Czech National Bank, Financial Statistical Information Macroeconomic Policies... 
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  There are therefore reasons to argue that the degree of restriction was overshot, in 
particular in the follow-up period after price liberalization. However, the resulting credit 
restraint was only to some extent due to the adopted policies and their objectives. The 
evolved divergence between the intentions and the actual credit developments appeared to 
account for aconsiderable share of the implied restriction in reality. The and the actual credit 
developments appeared to account for a causes of this divergence must be attributed 
especially to the existing conditions at the start of transition. All the parties involved, the 
Central Bank, commercial banks and their clients were exposed to a rapidly changing 
environment. Their decisionmaking was constrained by the discontinuities of the previous 
trends and institutions and, at the same time, faced many unknowns and uncertainty as for 
future developments. In the circumstances, commercial banks started to behave rather 
cautiously and, as a result, their credit activities developed only gradually and delayed.  
  Though the stagnating nominal money supply and its considerable fall in real terms, 
accompanied by a sharp increase in nominal interest rates can be identified as symptoms of 
an overshooting of credit restraint leading to credit crunch in 1991, a number of counter-
arguments made the above conclusion subject to reservations: 
-  while nominal interest rates increased substantially in 1991 compared to the previous 
period (see Table 13) and appeared therefore too high, the real interest rates in fact turned 
negative. Consequently, enterprises were subsidized by households. By the same token, the 
inflated price level significantly eroded the real volume of former enterprise debts, 
-  due to the price level jump in January 1991, after the price liberalization, enterprises' 
profits surged to a multiple, 
-  dramatic increase of interenterprise arrears, though itself to some extent a product of credit 
restraint, in reality implied a circumvention of tight credit conditions. 
  The successful restoration of price and monetary stability in the course of 1991 made 
possible a gradual relaxation of the restrictive policies. In 1992 (and in 1993 in the Czech 
Republic as well), the monetary policy shifted from restrictive to neutral stance. While 
adhering to this trend in principle, monetary authorities had to react to the changing climate 
and to arising disturbances. In the course of the year the control of money supply responded 
to faster than anticipated increase in foreign assets and in uncommitted resources of the major 
banks. However, the disturbing factors arose especially towards the end of 1992. It refers in 
particular to the split of the federal state and to the uncertainties about the future monetary 




Table 13. Czechoslovakia - Interest rates and inflation in 1989-1992 
                      1989          1990                    1991                    1992 
                            Q1    Q2    Q3    Q4    Q1    Q2    Q3    Q4    Q1    Q2    Q3    Q4 
 
Discount rate         4.0  5.0   5.0   5.0   8.5   10.0  10.0   9.5   9.5   9.0   9.0   8.0  9.5 
Lombard rate                                                                           11.5 14.0 
Refinancing credit 
3 month (auctions)                                             10.3  10.3  10.4  10.5  11.8 14.7 
Average interbank 
deposit rate                                       13.7  14.2  13.8  11.9  12.8  12.2  12.5    
Credits (average)     5.7  5.4   5.4   5.6   7.6   14.7  15.1  14.2  13.9  13.5  13.7  13.6 13.3 
  Short term                                       13.9  17.9  16.3  16.1  16.9  16.4  15.9 15.1 
  Medium term                                      13.5  15.4  14.1  14.2  15.9  15.7  15.5 15.2 
  Long term                                        15.1  10.5   9.9   9.6   9.5  10.1  10.2 10.2 
Deposits (average)    2.5  2.6   2.7   2.8   3.3    7.6   8.2   8.6   8.0   8.7   6.9   6.6  6.6 
  Demand deposits                                   2.2   2.5   2.3   2.7   3.0   2.8   2.5  2.4 
  Term deposits                                    12.3  13.2  13.7  13.1  12.9  10.6  10.6 10.6 
  of which 
     Short term                                    11.5  13.1  13.3  12.5   9.8   8.1   8.1  8.1 
     Medium term                                   13.7  13.9  14.7  14.1  14.2  12.7  12.4 12.1 
     Long term                                     10.0  13.4  17.4  17.6  15.9  13.9  14.3 14.5 
CPI1)                 1.4   2.4   3.1  13.6  18.4   40.9  49.2  49.5  53.6   1.8   3.0   6.4 11.5 
CPI2)                 1.4   3.4   3.9  14.1  18.4   54.7  68.5  56.3  52.7  16.6   7.8   7.8 11.6 
1) % change against of the end of previous year. 
2) % change against the same period of previous year. 
Source: Financial Statistical Information, Czech National Bank Macroeconomic Policies... 
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result, a significant decline of foreign exchange reserves materialized at the end of 1992 and 
in the first weeks of 1993, coupled with a re-emergence of inflationary pressures.  
  These disturbances notwithstanding, the macroeconomic stability was maintained 
throughout 1992, inflation did not exceed the targeted ceiling of 12% annual rate. Compared 
to 19.5 % originally set, money supply increased by 25% due particularly to the dynamic 
growth of credits to enterprises and households by 18.3%. 
 
Table 14. Czechoslovakia - Nominal and Real Money Supply Developments in 1989/1992 (in bn in CSK)   
 1989  Nominal Real 
  Q4  Q4 1992  Index 92/89  Q4 1992  Index 92/89 
Money (M1)  311,1  430,5  138,3%  207,3  66,6% 
Broad Money (M2)  547,8  839,9  153,3%  404,4  73,8% 
  Table 14 summarizies money supply developments in former Czechoslovakia 
between the fourth quarters of 1989 and 1992. Though the volume of both M1 and M2 
substantially increased compared to the base period, by 38% and 53% respectively, in real 
terms both aggregates were at the end of 1992 still significantly below the end-1989 level. 
This would hold even provided the price level jump of first quarter of 1991 was excluded. 
Accordingly, the data would suggest a long-term restrictive character of monetary policy. 
Such a conclusion should to be, however, qualified for the GDP developments. 
10. Changing Approaches and Means to Control Money Supply 
  Within a relatively short time span of 1990-92 a remarkable shift from direct 
regulation of monetary developments to their basically indirect control was accomplished. 
  In the first phase of transition, while departing from the centrally planned economy 
framework, monetary authorities made use of credit volume's and interest rate's ceilings to 
secure the implementation of monetary policy targets and to prevent undesirable soaring of 
interest rates in the existing non-competitive conditions on the domestic money markets. 
Despite their potential merits, the applied ceilings constrained commercial banks activities, 
even though the cautious policies the major commercial banks pursued in extending new 
credits made credit volumes' limits mostly not-binding in reality. Interest rate ceilings Klacek & Hrncir 
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interfered with the desirable differentiation of clients according to the appraisal of their 
creditworthinness and risk involved.  
  Both interest rate's and credit volume's ceilings were phased out in the course of 
1992,without any negative consequences. On the whole, the speed of interest rate de-
regulation was remarkable, even compared to the postwar experience of developed 
economies, and represented a clear signal of the authorities' determination to move as quickly 
as viable to a market type environment. Though the phased out ceilings seemed to be to some 
extent substituted by "window guidance" and moral persuasion by the Central Bank, 
commercial banks have been in principle free to set their lending and borrowing rates since 
then. The only important exception were the subsidized schemes of households loans 
extended in the past, in particular for housing construction. 
  Discount rate policy became active since the start of transition (compare Table 15). 
Up to April 1992 the short-term refinancing credits from the Central Bank were only 
available at the discount rate. In the course of time, however, the direct impact of discount 
rate on the level and pattern of interest rates has been weakening. The discount rate changes 
increasingly represented only a signal of the future course of Central Bank's policy. 
  The de-regulation process notwithstanding, the behaviour of interest rates and their 
pattern continued to reflect the rigidity and underdevelopment of money and foreign 
exchange markets. As follows from data in Table 13, in the period since the start of the 
transition in 1990 the values of real interest rates fluctuated from highly negative to positive 
ones. Though the extent and frequency of nominal interest rate's adjustments significantly 
increased compared to the previous period, the main cause of real interest rate's fluctuations 
were varying rates of domestic inflation. Accordingly, four sub-periods can be identified in 
the years 1990-1993: 
- from mid 1990 to mid 1991: surging price level and mostly highly negative real interest 
rates  
- from mid 1991 to the third quarter of 1992: price level stabilized and positive real interest 
rates prevailed  
- second inflationary wave at the end of 1992 and at the beginning of 1993: real interest rates 
turned again to negative values 
- from the second quarter of 1993 onwards: the tendency back to positive real interest rates. 
 Macroeconomic Policies... 
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Table 15. Interest rate policies in 1990-1993 
 
Date                  Discount   Lombard   Interest rate 
                       rate       rate       ceiling 
1990  January 1        4 %           ..           - 
      April 1          5 %           ..           - 
      October 1        7 %           ..          13 % 
      November 21      8 1/2 %       ..          22 1/2 % 
      December 28     10 %           ..          24 % 
1991  June 1          10 %           ..          22 % 
      August 1        10 %           ..          19 1/2 % 
      September 9      9 1/2 %       ..          17 % 
1992  March 25         9 %           ..      abolished as  
                                              of April 1 
      August 26        8 %        11 1/2 %        - 
      December 30      9 1/2 %    14 %            - 
1993  June 10          8 %           ..           - 
      August           8 %        12 1/2 %        - 
      December         8 %        11 1/2 %        - 
 
Source: Financial Statistical Information, Czech National Bank 
  Compared to mostly repressed inflation under the former centrally planned framewok, 
open inflation accelerated since the second half of 1990. The impact of the inflation proper 
(i.e. of core inflation) was, however, mixed with the impact of "corrective" price changes 
administered by the authorities, with the once-for-all institutional changes such as sweeping 
price liberalization at the beginning of 1991 and the reform of tax system, including the 
introduction of value-added tax at the start of 1993.  
  Summarizing the experience of the period 1990-1993, real interest rates acquired 
positive values when inflation was relatively low, and negative ones when inflation rate 
accelerated. This conclusion coincides with the lessons learned elsewhere: in the conditions 
of regulated interest rates and underdeveloped credit markets, the determining factor for real 
interest rate values was the extent of price level increases. The mentioned outcome also 
reflected the policies of the Central Bank. In the high inflation period the Bank's discount rate 
signalled that the surging price level should be considered only a temporary phenomenon. In 
the opposite situations, when inflation rate decreased to almost zero level, the discount rate's 
policy reflected the still inherent inflationary pressures. Klacek & Hrncir 
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  Though the inflation record of the former Czechoslovakia and of the Czech Republic 
in the years 1990-93 was more successful than elsewhere in the EMEs, the data suggest that 
the real interest rates, especially on deposits, were negative for protracted time spans. It refers 
in particular to the first months of  1991 and, to a lesser extent, to the beginning of 1993 as 
well. It implied a substantial resource transfer from creditors to debtors. As the overhelming 
share of savings  was generated by the households, while the major part of credits was 
contracted by the enterprises, households extended a substantial "hidden" subsidy to 
enterprises.   
11. Currency Convertibility 
  The 1990 reform programme set the implementation of currency convertibility as a 
key target of the transition policies. 
  While there was a general consensus about its desirability, views widely differed as to 
what type and degree of convertibility and, particularly, when. Should at least a limited type 
be introduced at the very beginning of the transition process (to follow, among others, the 
Polish approach) or should it be conceived an element only in a longer-term gradual 
adjustment (the concept followed in Western Europe in the 1950s). 
  Czechoslovak authorities opted for an "early" option and for a simultaneous 
liberalization in both the domestic and external spheres. These measures were implemented 
as a concerted package at the beginning of 1991. The type of convertibility introduced was 
"internal convertibility for registered businesses on current account items". This regime was 
to secure free and unlimited access to foreign exchange for import purposes, while the 
proceeds from exports should be transferred to the authorized banks at the current rate of 
exchange. The scheme was later-on extended to non-registered businesses as well and further 
liberalized, providing also for the hedging against currency risks. 
  However, the identification of the concept introduced as "internal convertibility on 
current account items" does not seem to be precise. On the one hand, the convertibility 
regime has not been yet officially extended for tourist purposes. Citizens have the right to 
maintain private foreign exchange accounts, but they are entitled to buy only a limited 
amount of foreign exchange per year at the current rate of exchange. For 1992 and 1993 that Macroeconomic Policies... 
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amount was set at the equivalent of CSK 7500, i.e. about USD 270 at the current exchange 
rate. (A significant share of citizens do not use this possibility at all.) 
  The capital account has not been entirely closed in reality. The inflow of foreign 
exchange funds for joint-ventures, foreign direct investment and portfolio investment was 
virtually unregulated and the free repatriation of both profits and principal guaranteed, among 
other due to the agreements on the protection of investment and on the prevention of double 
taxation concluded with most relevant countries.  
  As for the regime for domestic subjects, firms are entitled to contract credits in 
foreign exchange abroad subject to the consent of the Czech National Bank. This consent was 
in reality confined to the Bank's prior notification. While maintaining their foreign exchange 
accounts, commercial banks with foreign exchange licence are to comply with the regime of 
"open foreign exchange positions" set by the Czech National Bank.  
  The main mechanism of implementing the regime of currency convertibility has been 
the inter-bank foreign exchange market initiated in 1991 and composed of the Central Bank 
and of commercial banks with foreign exchange licence. At the end of 1992  27 commercial 
banks participated (22 from the Czech Republic and 5 from Slovakia).  
  Up to September 1992, the regulation set for inter-bank foreign exchange market 
required commercial banks to maintain their foreign exchange liquidity ratio, i.e. the ratio of 
their foreign exchange assets to liabilities in the range of 0.85 to 1.05. When getting below 
the lower limit, a commercial bank was expected to buy foreign exchange from the Central 
Bank, and when above the upper limit, it should sell it back. 
  In September 1992 the scheme was substituted by a more flexible system of "open 
foreign exchange positions". This requires the sum of bank's "short" and "long" foreign 
exchange positions not to exceed 30% of the capital core of the given bank.  
  The policies of the Central Bank have been oriented towards a progressing 
liberalization on foreign exchange front, with the aim to create conditions for a shift from 
"internal" to "external" type of currency convertibility.  
 Klacek & Hrncir 
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12. Exchange Rate Developments 
  Given a wide range of uncertainties faced at the beginning of the transition, both 
domestic and external, the selection of exchange rate level and of exchange rate regime was 
far from being an unambiguous and non-controversial issue.  
  Czechoslovakia opted for a fixed exchange rate regime, with the aim to use nominal 
exchange rate as an instrument of macroeconomic stabilization, i.e. as a nominal anchor of 
the stabilization process. This approach followed the suit applied elsewhere in stabilization 
programmes, making use of the fact that exchange rate is a special "macroeconomic" price, 
with impact across the entire national economy. 
  The Czechoslovak Koruna (CSK) and later on the Czech Koruna (CK) has been 
pegged to a basket since the beginning of January 1991 and this peg has remained virtually 
untouched4.  
  A realistically competitive exchange rate is the major factor conditioning sustainable 
balance-of-payments developments. At the beginning of the transition the requirements 
associated with the programmed sweeping liberalization and opening of the economy called 
for an initial undervaluation compared to what could be called "fundamental equilibrium 
exchange rate". The controversial issue was by how much to deviate and, consequently, by 
how much to devalue. 
  The aim was to avoid both unnecessary large undervaluation, which would imply 
inflationary cost-push pressures and mitigate the desirable disciplining function of foreign 
competition, as well as overvaluation, which would result in unsustainable balance-of-
payments deficits, undermining the very existence of currency convertibility and of the 
liberalization programme. 
                                                 
    4 Both the composition of the basket and the relative weights of individual currencies were, however, revised 
on an annual basis. The respective shares in 1991 were as follows: DEM 45.52%, USD 31.34%, ATS 12.35%, 
CHF 6.55%, GBP 4.24%. The revised composition of 1992: USD 49.07%, DEM 36.15%, ATS 8.07%, CHF 
3.79%, FRF 2.92%.As of May 2,1993 the basket of the Czech koruna is confined to only DEM and USD, with 
the weights 65% and 35% respectively. Macroeconomic Policies... 
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  A wide range of values was proposed, from CSK 16 per USD (which was close to the 
former "commercial rate") up to 35-40 CSK, i.e. approaching the marginal and parallel 
market ratios. Finally, the exchange rate with which Czechoslovakia started its stabilization 
and liberalization programme was set at CSK 28 per USD. 
  In reality, this rate was the outcome of the three successive  devaluations of the CSK 
vis-a-vis convertible currencies in the course of 1990: CSK was devalued by 16.6% on 
January 8, by 55.3% on October 15, and by 15.985 on December 28, 1990. 
  However, the first two devaluations represented more-or-less only administrative 
corrections of the existing exchange ratios, rather than proper devaluations, being 
implemented as isolated acts without accompanying price liberalization. Their rationale was 
thus rather limited. 
  The second devaluation was originally scheduled only for the beginning of 1991 as a 
component of the liberalization package (which also implied phasing out the scheme of 
foreign exchange retention quotas of exporting firms). Being discussed in public, as a 
preannounced policy, enterprises and households started to behave accordingly. Imports 
dramatically increased in the second half of 1990, along with the growing pressure on the 
liquidity of the banking sector and on foreign exchange reserves. 
  Moreover, despite the official support from abroad to the reform programme of the 
new, non-communist Czechoslovak government, a substantial share of foreign investors 
recalled their deposits from Czechoslovak banks at that time. 
  The second devaluation, effected on October 15, 1990, was thus an "unplanned" act, 
implemented under distress, with the aim to reverse the depletion of foreign exchange 
reserves.  
  These developments reminded to the authorities the role of expectations and 
represented a harsh lesson on their own conduct and policies. However, the tensions which 
evolved also prompted them to err rather in overshot undervaluation than the other way 
round. As a result, the third of the successive devaluations followed, fixing exchange rate at 
CSK 28 per USD. Klacek & Hrncir 
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  While the nominal exchange rate remained stabilized in the period, the calculations of 
real effective exchange rate (REER) indicated gradual, but persistent appreciation. Between 
December 1990 and December 1992 the REER based on CPI appreciated by 41%, and that 
based on PPI by more than 44%. According to the standard reasoning it implied a 
corresponding loss in relative competitiveness. 
  As a result, the competitive edge of the devaluations effected in 1990 appeared to be 
in principle eroded at the end of 1992.  
  Compared to Poland and Hungary, the major factor which enabled to maintain the 
nominal exchange rate of the CSK unchanged was a more favourable inflation record in the 
period under consideration.  
 
Table 16. Consumer prices in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland in 1986-92  (average annual 
percentage changes over the previous year) 
                 1986  1987  1988  1989  1990 1991  1992 
Czechoslovakia    0.5   0.1   0.2   1.4  10.0 57.9  10.3 
Hungary           5.3   8.6  15.5  17.0  28.9 35.0  23.0 
Poland           17.7  25.0  60.0 251.0 586.0 70.0  40.0 
Source: Statistical Yearbook 1993 of the Czech Republic 
  Notwithstanding this "comparative advantage" in terms of the transition economies, 
the price level increases were distinctly higher compared to "standard" market economies, 
even though also due to the institutional and administrative changes, and not only to 
"genuine" inflationary factors alone. 
  The mentioned disparity in inflation rates vis-a-vis partner market economies 
persisted in 1993 as well. While the government's and the Central Bank's policy target was in 
the range of 16-18%, the final annual rate against the previous year was 20.8%. As a result, 
the trend towards REER's appreciation continued, and even accelerated in 1993. 
  Though later on than Poland and Hungary, the Czech Republic faces the challenge 
what type of exchange rate policies (or what changes) to adopt to maintain competitiveness in 
the world markets and to balance foreign exchange accounts in medium run. Macroeconomic Policies... 
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